A New Cold War Emerging?

A number of troubling developments arose in the past few days concerning Russian relations with the West and the aftermath of the war in Georgia.

1) In defiance of calls by Europe and the United States to respect the internationally-recognized borders of Georgia, Russia officially recognized the independence of the breakaway Georgian provinces of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Georgia called the move a blatant territorial grab in violation of the recent ceasefire.

2) Russia announced that it is halting military cooperation with NATO, and warned that it is prepared to cut all ties with the alliance. Even before the Georgian conflict erupted, Russian-NATO ties were strained over NATO moves toward installing ballistic missile defense systems in Poland and the Czech Republic, as well as the possibility of Georgia and Ukraine becoming NATO members.

This will have serious repercussions for the NATO forces in Afghanistan, who rely on logistical lines through Russia. Instability in Pakistan, worsened by the recent resignation of pro-US President Pervez Musharraf, endangered another of NATO's primary logistical connections leading into landlocked Afghanistan.

3) The European Union is considering sanctions against Russia in response to its recognition of indepedence for South Ossetia and Abkhazia. EU leaders discussed sanctions as well as various other means of punishing Moscow for undermining Georgian sovereignty. The EU's moves were echoed by the "Group of Seven States" economic organization (G7) -- Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the US -- who talked of serious repercussions for Russia.

4) The presence of nine NATO warships in the Black Sea delivering humanitarian aid to war-torn Georgia could prove explosive amid tense US-Russian relations. There are reportedly nine more ships en route to the Black Sea, where Russia has just returned its flagship cruiser 'Moskva', where it will reportedly perform weapons tests. Russia has already complained about the NATO ships near the Georgian coast.

Having numerous warships in close proximity to each other during a time of such enormous tensions -- especially with one side conducting "weapons tests" in the area -- is very worrisome. There are countless ways in which miscommunications, malfunctions, or small mishaps between the tense forces could escalate out of control. If tensions do accidentally or unnecessarily boil over into some sort of altercation, the consequences could threaten the entire world.

Statements by numerous diplomats, analysts, and pundits warn of an emerging "Second Cold War", even as the world hopes the situation does not escalate into a more dangerous "hot" war.

Humanitarian Crisis in Georgia

From The Independent:

Meanwhile, the humanitarian crisis continued to grow, with more than 115,000 people fleeing the conflict. Ossetian, Cossack and Chechen militias which had come in behind the Russian troops had been on a spree of killings, looting and burning in the villages around Gori, and dead bodies had been left piled up in the heat, leading to fears of an outbreak of disease.

In Tbilisi, refugees from Georgian villages in South Ossetia crammed into makeshift centres with few facilities. Around 500 people had taken up residence in a former governmental building without even basic amenities.

The stench of body odour hung in the air, as growing numbers of destitute Georgians arrived. Most slept on the hard, dirty floors, and had no possessions with them, save for the clothes they were wearing when they fled. Phone calls to those left behind in their villages brought only bad news – Ossetian militias were looting and torching their houses, making sure they could never return.

Both sides have been accused of atrocities in the war. The Independent was the first Western media organisation to reach Tskhinvali, the capital of breakaway South Ossetia. They found a city in ruins following the initial pulverising Georgian bombardment and the ferocious Russian counter-attack. Homeless people, many of them injured, were seeking sanctuary. Stray dogs, according to local inhabitants, were chewing the flesh from human bodies.

In a sign of the ferocious sectarian divisions, the South Ossetian paramilitaries who held the Independent reporters at gunpoint repeatedly threatened to kill their Georgian driver, Merabi Chrikishilli, and vowed retribution on all Georgians when the Russians crossed the border.

This threat was carried out – with devastating effect on civilians – as the Georgian army panicked and fled from Gori, its main base in the region, amid streams of refugees fleeing the violence. The victims were mainly the old and infirm, unable to undertake the arduous journey to safety.

Merabi Chrikishilli's elderly relatives are among many people now hiding in cellars, with little food and water, while armed gangs roam through the villages. Some refugees who had fled from Georgian enclaves, under attack in South Ossetia, have now found themselves trapped in the Russian-controlled zones at the mercy of the militias.

Dr Georgia Abramishvili, a 28-year-old surgeon who had treated those injured when the Russians carried out their first bombing of Gori, died in the final strikes, when an air-to-ground missile smashed into the grounds of the hospital, despite a Red Cross flag flying on the roof to deter any such attack.

Russian officers in Georgia denied that their forces had carried out attacks on civilians. Some admitted, however, that atrocities were being carried out by the militias. Major General Vyacheslav Nikolaevich Borisov, the commander in charge of Gori, said: "Ossetians are running around and killing poor Georgians. This is a problem and we are trying to deal with it. I have ordered my men to arrest anyone carrying out looting and other criminal acts."

In Tskhinvali yesterday, the South Ossetians paraded around 40 haggard and frightened-looking Georgian civilian captives through the city. Most were elderly men, many with cuts and bruises on their faces, walking with their shoulders slumped. A militiaman hit one of the men on the head as he walked by.

[...]

The Georgian President is now a beleaguered figure, engaged in increasingly erratic public acts. The day after his army panicked and fled from the strategic city of Gori, he held a victory rally in Tbilisi. And even after his army fled Gori without the Russians even firing a shot, he led a patriotic rally in central Tbilisi promising never to surrender.

On Friday, after five hours of negotiations, Ms Rice persuaded Mr Saakashvili to sign up to the ceasefire, promising a package of economic aid but making very clear there would be no military help. Nor did she say what would happen if the Russians did not sign up to the ceasefire.

But the Secretary of State then stood stony-faced as the Georgian President appeared to lose control at the press conference, repeatedly calling the Russians "barbarians" who were raping his country. Local analysts say that opposition to Mr Saakashvili has been muted during the conflict, but may grow afterwards, making his position untenable.

Even the ceasefire, to which Russia has now agreed, contains ambiguities that Moscow is likely to exploit to keep up the pressure on Mr Saakashvili, whom it detests, and to maximise the embarrassment for Mr Bush. Only after "additional security measures" are in place would Russia withdraw its forces from the conflict zone, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, said yesterday, claiming this proviso formed part of the ceasefire signed by President Dmitry Medvedev.

Mixed Signals in Georgia

Moscow continues to send mixed signals about its intentions in Georgia. While Russia and Georgia have signed a ceasefire agreement, there is apparently some debate between the two sides as to what the ceasefire actually says, and what it requires of the two nations. After the agreement was signed, Russian president Dmitry Medvedev officially called for a halt to operations in Georgia. Despite this, Russian troops continue to consolidate their positions, and there are reports that some Russian forces have advanced beyond Gori to within 25 miles of the Georgian capital.

Russian officials claimed that their recent maneuvers closer to Tbilisi (and into positions toward the flanks of the capital) were to create a corridor for Russian forces to withdraw. It is questionable why such maneuvers would be necessary in order for Russia to pull back. This raises the question of whether they are feinting toward Tbilisi as a final show of defiance prior to withdrawal, or if they might actually attempt a brazen advance on the capital.

It is clear that Russia is taking its time to establish itself in Georgia, sending the message that they can do whatever they want there, and that they will be the ones to dictate the way the war ends. It is impossible to tell at this point whether Russia intends to maintain a military presence throughout Georgia, seemingly in violation of the ceasefire agreement, or if they are just sending a message prior to their withdrawal.

Russia's failure to immediately withdraw back to South Ossetia and Abkhazia is increasing tensions with the United States, and Russia is also sending a message to Washington. President Bush is in no position to force Russia to do anything, and everyone knows it. Considering recent tensions between Russia and the US over missile defense systems in Poland and other forms of NATO encroachment, it is likely that Russia is demonstrating its ability and willingness to respond to what it perceives as threats on its borders.

The longer Russia holds their positions in Georgia, a number of things will happen.
1) Tensions with the US and Europe will increase.
2) Oil transports through Georgia will remain frozen (this increases pressure on Europe and demonstrates Western vulnerability).
3) Russia will demonstrate its power over the defeated Georgia.
4) The humanitarian situation in Georgia will get worse, with more people fleeing, resources stretching thin, and lawlessness getting worse.

It is most likely that Russia is now merely trying to send a message to Georgia and the West, and things will probably not escalate much further as long as this is the case. If Russia overtly attempts to oust Saakashvili's government, launches further sizable offensives into Georgian territory, or continues to bleed Georgia for too long by holding their positions, things could escalate again and get out of hand quickly.

What Really Happened In South Ossetia

A quick (though necessarily incomplete) background of the situation in South Ossetia and the complex history of the region is necessary to understand the roots of the conflict. When the Soviet Union collapsed, the Georgian provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia -- both populated by groups ethnically, culturally, and linguistically different from Georgians -- rebelled against the government in Tbilisi, seeking independence. The Georgian government was able to prevent all-out secession by the two provinces, but could not bring the regions totally under its control.

In 1992, a ceasefire was declared and a peacekeeping force of Russians, Ossetians, and Georgians was assembled under a legal agreement between the parties, to prevent further outbreaks of violence. For more than a decade after the ceasefire, things were relatively quiet in South Ossetia. Tensions between Russia and Georgia began to increase in the past few years, however, as Georgia became more aligned with NATO and the United States, and more opposed to Russian influence. Russia responded by increasing support for the separatist groups in the breakaway provinces, offering Russian citizenship to Ossetians, and taking a hard line against the pro-Western Georgian government of Mikhail Saakashvili.

After the 1992 ceasefire, South Ossetia received little support from the Georgian government, and became a de facto protectorate and beneficiary of Russia. Most South Ossetians hold Russian passports, receive government benefits from the Russian government, and are highly integrated into the Russian economy. In many ways, the people of South Ossetia are as much a part of Russia as their relatives across the border in the Russian province of North Ossetia.

Something like 99 percent of South Ossetians -- who share more in common with Iranians linguistically, ethnically, and culturally than they do with Georgians -- want independence from Georgia. South Ossetia is part of Georgia (and not Russia) largely by historical accident, and Ossetians share little in common with the rest of the Georgian nation.

The situation in Ossetia is in many ways comparable to that in Kosovo, with an ethnically and linguistically distinct group seeking independence from a larger nation. When NATO backed Kosovo's moves for independence, Russia warned that dangerous precedents were being set. We are now seeing how true that is, as Russia supports its own "Kosovo" as it seeks independence and self-determination.

The standard media narrative surrounding the South Ossetian conflict is something along these lines: Russia invades Georgia, Russia kills civilians, little Georgia is generally victimized by big, evil Russia. It seems that the Western press is so used to vilifying Russia that they cannot see the much more complicated reality. This reality is that, while Russia's motives in South Ossetia are not entirely selfless or humanitarian, the war and its tragedies are largely the fault of Georgian president Mikheil Saakashvili.

There are no "good guys" in this war. By launching a massive assault on Tskhinvali on August 7, Georgia breached a long-standing, legally-established ceasefire and attacked legitimately-placed Russian peacekeepers. The assault on Tskhinvali, which was launched immediately after Saakashvili deceptively agreed to a ceasefire with the South Ossetian separatists, included massive, indiscriminate bombardment of the entire city with artillery and rockets. The civilian casualties caused by the initial Georgian attack did not receive nearly as much coverage as the Russian response (largely because the international media did not yet have a significant presence in Ossetia), but the Georgian attack was at least as devastating in terms of civilian suffering as the Russian response.

After the initial assault on Tskhinvali, Russian reinforcements quickly regained control of the city and pushed the Georgian forces out of South Ossetia. A series of Russian air attacks took out military airfields, bases, communications infrastructure, factories, and other military assets in the central city of Gori, the port city of Poti, and elsewhere in Georgia. Unfortunately, the media focused on the few cases in which Russian airstrikes missed their targets and hit civilians. This is somewhat ironic coming from the same media establishment that totally disregards civilian casualties in Iraq and Afghanistan as unavoidable and insignificant "collateral damage".

In attacking South Ossetia, it seems Saakashvili sought to improve his political situation by restoring Georgian authority in the breakaway province, but he ended up overplaying his hand horribly. He underestimated the Russian response and overestimated Western support once shots were fired. The initial bombardment of Tskhinvali killed civilians in an indiscriminate manner, and may fit the definition of a war crime. From a political standpoint, Russia had little choice but to respond forcefully.

The Western press seems obsessed with accusing the Russian military with acting in a "disproportionate" manner, especially for attacking Georgian military assets on the Black Sea coast and elsewhere outside of South Ossetia. If the media knew anything about the fundamentals of warfare, they would know that there is no "proportion" in war. The objective in war is always the complete destruction of the enemy's warmaking capability. This may sound harsh, but it is in reality necessary, since failure to seek this ultimate objective can result in long, protracted, and ultimately more damaging wars in which neither side can gain a decisive advantage.

Targeting of non-combatants and non-military targets should always be prohibited, but this is not a matter of "proportion", it is a matter of limiting attacks to military targets. In truth, Russia's fast and decisive response likely spared further bloodshed, since any half-way "proportionate" response would have left the Georgian military intact and allowed fighting to continue much longer. This talk of Russian excess seems even more strange in light of the fact that the Georgian forces (numbering at least 40,000) have outnumbered the Russian forces (numbering 30,000 at most) all throughout the conflict.

It should also be noted that mere hours after the Georgian military began bombarding Tskhinvali, Russia brought the issue before an emergency meeting of the UN Security Council, seeking an immediate ceasefire and end to the fighting. The United States and Britain blocked the resolution, objecting to language in the declaration that would condemn the "use of military force" by either side, leaving Russia with little option but to respond to the Georgian attack. In essence, Russia tried to end the war before it became a war, and Georgia's allies in the UN rejected the peace proposal.

The main motives and goals of each side (in no particular order) going into the conflict were as follows:

Georgia:
Secure the separatist province that has been a thorn in Saakashvili's side for some time.
Remove Russian influence from South Ossetia by ousting the Moscow-backed separatist authority.
Show the US and NATO that Georgia is capable of controlling its own territory. (Georgia is seeking NATO membership.)

In the end, Saakashvili was pushed out of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, his military is in ruins, and his political position suffered greatly. He sought to flex his muscles against Russian influence, regain control of Ossetia, and show himself a strong leader. He accomplished much the opposite.

Russia:
Respond to Georgian aggression against peacekeepers in South Ossetia.
Defend Ossetians (who hold Russian citizenship) and restore the legally-established status quo.
Send a message regarding aggressive NATO encroachment on Russia's borders.
Assert Russia's dominant role in the region.

Russian president Dmitry Medvedev responded quickly and decisively to the Georgian attack, defended Russian citizens, and made clear that Russia would not tolerate attacks against its troops and citizens. The Russian response quickly routed the numerically-superior Georgian forces, destroyed Georgian military infrastructure, and secured Russian influence in both Ossetia and Abkhazia. Notwithstanding the West's demonization of Russia's every move, Russia turned the war to their advantage quite adeptly.

Tensions Explode In Georgia

(Note: this is a very rough outline of what is going on, intended to present a general picture of the situation as it evolves. I will follow up with more specific, detailed, and coherent analysis.)

The world geopolitical scene has heated up considerably today as tensions between Russia and its former Soviet satellite state, Georgia, have exploded into an all-out military conflict. Relations between the two countries have been deteriorating for some time, as Georgian president Mikheil Saakashvili pursued pro-Western policies that challenged Russia's influence in the region, even signaling hopes of joining NATO. Russia has responded by militarily and economically supporting anti-government separatist groups in Georgia's northern provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

Here's how things have escalated so far:

Georgian president Saakashvili launched a large offensive into the separatist province of South Ossetia, which borders Russia. Georgian forces took control of the city of Tskhinvali, South Ossetia's capitol, before being overwhelmed by responding Russian forces. Early reports indicate that 10 Russian "peacekeepers" (in reality Russian forces supporting separatist groups in the province) were killed in the initial Georgian assault, as well as an undetermined number of Russian nationals.

According to reports by the Stratfor intelligence service, it is estimated that Russia has now moved at least 600 tanks and 2,000 armored vehicles (8 motor rifle regiments, 2 tank regiments, 2 airborne regiments, and 2-3 artillery regiments) into the fight against Georgia. The Russian Air Force is also utilizing its massive air power -- consisting of MiG-29 and Su-27 fighters, Su-24 fighter/bombers, Su-25 close air support (CAS) attack aircraft, and Mi-24 Hind helicopter gunships -- to overwhelm Georgian forces.

The main Russian advance southward into Georgia is through the Roki Tunnel, which cuts through mountainous terrain and connects the Russian province of North Ossetia with Georgian South Ossetia. You can see a satellite view of the location of the conflict, with a couple important landmarks, on Google Maps here.

The situation has the potential to escalate from a regional squabble between Russia and Georgia into a much wider global conflict. The conflict between the pro-Western, pro-American Georgia and a Russian leadership that is attempting to reassert its primacy in the region reflects a wider conflict between the interests of Russia and its allies, and an expanding Anglo-American-European NATO organization that is encroaching on Russia's "near abroad."

The Washington Post has already published an editorial saying that "The US and its allies must unite against Moscow's war on Georgia." While the US military is relatively well-placed in the region for a reaction (with large logistical bases in Turkey, Iraq capable of supporting limited military reaction in the area), it is already stretched to limit with commitments in Afghanistan and Iraq. More importantly, the ramifications of military action in support of the Georgian government could be horrific.

Washington's reaction to this outbreak will signal America's willingness to support strategic eastern- and central-European allies against aggression by rival powers. The conflict in Georgia is therefore symbolic of wider tensions in global politics, and has the potential to grow much more. American and European interest in the vast oil transport infrastructure in the region will also no doubt play a role in the determination of Washington's reaction, as it has no doubt influenced Moscow's decision to attack the recalcitrant Georgian republic.