Afghanistan: A Strategic Analysis

Early Thursday morning, approximately 4,000 Marines from the 2nd Marine Expeditionary Brigade moved into the Taliban-controlled Helmand River valley in southern Afghanistan. This marked the beginning of the first large-scale operation in Afghanistan to implement a new set of counterinsurgency (COIN) practices -- practices adapted from General David Petraeus' Iraq "surge" strategy.

The COIN strategy at the center of this new operation concentrates on building economic and political infrastructure, protecting the Afghan population, and establishing a working relationship between the people of Helmand and the Afghan government. Whereas the emphasis was once on "kinetic" operations targeting Taliban forces, US forces are now to be primarily concerned with assisting and protecting the Afghan people rather than hunting the enemy. In order to do this, Marine units will move into small outposts, dispersed among the population, much like they did in Baghdad during the 2007 surge.

Media accounts have thus far focused mainly on the similarities between the new operation and the successful Iraq surge of 2007. However, the immense geographical and political differences between Iraq and Afghanistan will play a greater role in determining the outcome of this operation.

In Iraq, concentrated counterinsurgency efforts in the central hub of Baghdad had the effect of spreading stability throughout the country. Afghanistan, on the other hand, has no such urban center where COIN efforts can be concentrated. The country's harsh mountainous landscape also serves to isolate communities from each other in a way not seen in Iraq. Less than 10 percent of the nation's population lives in large cities, and as a result stabilization efforts require greater troop numbers, more dispersed throughout the country.

The enemy in Afghanistan is also quite different from that in Iraq. The Iraqi insurgency was highly fractured -- consisting of many opposing Sunni and Shiite militias and foreign terrorist elements. The US military's ability to leverage hostilities between these groups (in the form of the Anbar Awakening, where Sunni militants turned against foreign terrorist elements) was central to the success of the surge.

In contrast, the Afghan Taliban has acted for some time in Helmand as a de facto government, after forcing government officials and police out of the area. This grants them a unique degree of legitimacy and support among the population not enjoyed by Iraq's militant factions. Whether Afghan citizens' support for the Taliban is merely a begrudging product of fear, or willing support, is hotly contested among experts.

The US military, however, is counting on the willingness of the Afghan people to turn against the Taliban once US forces bring some degree of stability and progress. Whatever the Afghan peoples' attitudes toward the Taliban, winning their support will also require tangible improvement in the Afghan government, which is perceived as hopelessly corrupt and ineffective.

The challenges presented by Afghanistan are uniquely daunting. The prospect of success will depend greatly on US forces' ability to quickly and effectively adapt strategies to unforseen circumstances and unique challenges. In a nation more populous and geographically dispersed than Iraq, and with only a fraction of the manpower, victory in Afghanistan is far from certain. In such a fight, a firm understanding of the enemy, the underlying politics, and the geography can mean the difference between victory and defeat.

Calling North Korea's Bluff

Kim Jong-Il, "Dear Leader" of the backwards, bellicose, dystopian dictatorship that has held its southern neighbor hostage for half a century, is truly unique in his twisted ingenuity. He defied the international community's resolutions, demands and threats for decades, while extracting concessions from the world's most powerful nations. He developed nuclear weapons, conducted ballistic missile tests, and openly threatened other nations. He is among the world's most dangerous proliferators of weapons of mass destruction, if not the most dangerous. Despite all this, Kim and his pathetically stagnant nation remain, for all practical purposes, untouchable.

In response to North Korea's most recent bout of nuclear tests and threats, hawks in Washington are once again calling for a hard, unforgiving approach. The Wall Street Journal's Gordon G. Chang recently gave voice to these hawkish sentiments in his article "How to Stop North Korea's Weapons Proliferation". According to Chang, North Korea's recent renunciation of the 1953 armistice, which in effect ended the Korean War, means that the US and North Korea are once again technically belligerents at war. This gives the United States legal standing to interdict North Korean vessels -- specifically the Kang Nam, an infamous proliferating ship now being trailed by the US Navy.

Chang proposes that rather than passively watching the Kang Nam unload its illegal goods, the US Navy should board it and seize its crew and cargo -- an approach that North Korea already said it would consider to be an "act of war". So once again the US is presented with a now-familiar choice: allow Kim Jong-Il to thumb his nose at the world, or risk the resumption of war on the Korean peninsula.

Beneath all the posturing and blustering rhetoric, the reality is this: as long as Kim's masses of artillery (and WMDs) stand ready to incinerate the bustling city of Seoul with its 10 million inhabitants, the aggressive proposals of Chang and countless other frustrated hawks will remain nothing more than dangerous fantasies. No matter how many nuclear tests Kim conducts, the United States is unwilling to call his bluff and risk not only war, but the slaughter of millions of South Korean civilians.

It is hard to imagine that Chang is unaware of this fundamental reality of US-North Korean relations. Nevertheless, he carefully plans this "legally justified" attack on the Kang Nam, conveniently omitting any mention of the catastrophic result that could follow.

Perhaps most disturbing is Chang's concluding remark: "North Korea, after all, has resumed the Korean War." In the end it seems that Chang is prepared to justify such a risk with a technicality. The Korean People's Army declared that it would "not be bound" by the 1953 armistice; therefore we have license to provoke the mass slaughter of millions.

US-North Korean relations are largely based on the unfortunate fact that Kim Jong-Il holds the city of Seoul hostage. As long as North Korea holds this trump card, talk by US hawks of naval seizures, attacks on nuclear facilities, or blockades is foolish. This is even truer because Kim very well may not be bluffing -- the insulated, eccentric leader's mental health has been called into question more than once.

As tensions with North Korea inevitably continue to escalate in the coming weeks, we must be careful to ensure that the reckless aggression of hawks like Chang does not gain traction. Though our inability to stem North Korean belligerence may be frustrating, it is certainly preferable to the extreme risk of calling a madman's bluff.