Why Iran Matters

The unrest of the past few days in Iran has seized center stage in world politics, as countless people throughout the world become involved in supporting the Iranian protesters' cause. It is clear that events in Iran captured the imagination of the world, but what is less clear is why these events are truly important to Americans and other non-Iranians.

Recent events in Iran are important to us for at least two reasons. First, they represent a centuries-old struggle between liberty and oppression. Of course, Mir-Hussein Moussavi, the Iranian "reform" candidate championed by many Iranian protesters, is far from a liberal in the western sense. He has a solid record of supporting the strict structure of the Islamic republic.

However, he is far more pro-liberty than Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, promising reforms in women's rights and moves toward general (though gradual) modernization. The struggle of the Iranian people to have their votes counted -- and to have a say in their government -- should be defended even if their chosen candidate is less than perfect. The election in Iran was far from free or open, and there is good reason to question its legitimacy. What is most important is not who the Iranian people choose, but that they are defending their right to make that choice.

Less obvious and yet more important to us is what the Iranian protests show us about the changing nature of political power and dissent in the modern world. An excellent piece on the blog Journal Squared compares the technologically-empowered ferocity of the Iranian movement with the 1999 Seattle WTO protests. The Seattle protests made headlines for activists' innovative and highly effective use of technology to organize and communicate. The world was shocked by their ability to outsmart and overpower better-funded, better-armed, and better-trained authorities.

This new form of "networked, anonymous and decentralized protest movement" quickly adapts and ends up overwhelming political leaders. The result is either the collapse of centralized leadership ability or frenzied overreaction by authorities -- either outcome is beneficial to the cause of the protesters.

The RAND Corporation, one of the foremost defense policy think tanks in the United States, called this technologically-enabled form of resistance "netwar", and identified it as among the greatest threats to modern governments. Short for "networked warfare", RAND says that this new style of conflict, "depends heavily on information and communications technology, nonhierarchical organization, and tactics that are distinctly different from previous forms of civil-society conflicts."

Compared to older forms of protest and resistance, netwar is vastly more effective at disrupting the mechanisms of state power and undermining the legitimacy of targeted organizations. Using simple technologies like mobile phones and social media (i.e. twitter, etc), protesters can quickly organize actions (demonstrations, riots, attacks on specific entities, etc), react to police movements, and build vast global support structures.

The Iranian election is demonstrating how greatly these tactics have advanced with the advancement and spread of communications technology. Before the election, few experts predicted any kind of sizeable reaction by the Iranian people. Then, beginning with the declaration of victory by Ahmadinejad, a massive resistance movement emerged with unprecedented speed and reach. Within hours of the results being announced, a global network of support began forming.

When the Iranian government attempted to cut communications and isolate the dissidents, thousands of people throughout the world began helping the effort: setting up proxies to circumvent government filters, attacking government websites, and keeping lines of communication open despite the best efforts of the Iranian state. Much like in open-source software development, the distributed and coordinated efforts of these people converged to form a highly effective product.

Iranian students and dissidents massed by the hundreds of thousands and more in cities throughout Iran with little advance notice, empowered by new communication technologies. Movements of pro-Ahmadinejad militias, police, and military forces were constantly relayed among protesters. International journalists were banned from covering the protests, and protesters filled the information gap in near real-time with thousands of pictures, videos, and text accounts of events on the ground.

According to Col. John Boyd, one of the foremost warfare theorists of our time, conflict is broadly explained by a cyclical process called the OODA loop. In this process, agents in a conflict (whether they are generals commanding armies or fighter pilots flying planes) first Observe, then Orient themselves, then Decide on a course of action, and then finally Act.

For example, a fighter pilot (the theory was originally devised to describe aerial combat) must first observe his surroundings, orient himself in relation to the enemy and other relevant considerations, decide on the best course of action (speed up, slow down, climb, dive, etc), and finally act on that decision. This action will produce a new set of circumstances to be observed, and the cycle begins again. Boyd said that the agent in a conflict who can most quickly cycle through this OODA loop will gain a decisive advantage over his enemy, since he will be able to seize the initiative and dictate the terms of the fight. This is often termed "getting inside" the enemy's OODA loop, since one can observe and act many times while the enemy completes only one observation-action cycle.

In Iran, protesters empowered by modern communications technology are able to "get inside" the OODA loop of state forces by virtue of their decentralized and well-connected nature. Government forces must wait while information travels up to superiors and decisions travel down the chain of command. However, "netwarriors" can individually assess the situation (using technologically-delivered information) and react quickly to changing circumstances. Furthermore, the sheer number of individuals involved in such a decentralized effort result in remarkably fast and creative problem-solving abilities.

Thus we see that the protests in Iran are really the next step in the development of a revolutionary new political reality. In this new reality, barriers to communication and organization are torn down. Like-minded individuals can quickly build powerful ad hoc organizations that span the globe. The sluggish structures of the government are overwhelmed by fast, agile, infinitely flexible networks.

In short, the most basic rules of political power and control are being undermined and replaced with a more open, decentralized model of cooperation. The technologies driving this trend toward decentralized empowerment are only becoming more potent and ubiquitous. No matter what ends up happening in Iran, netwar is here to stay.