"Kabul is not Baghdad"

As the Obama administration prepares to launch what is being called an "Afghanistan Surge", it is more important than ever to recognize the considerable differences between Iraq and Afghanistan, and how those differences will affect strategy. A valuable guide to this topic was provided by US general Eric Olsen in a Christian Science Monitor article titled "Rethink the Afghanistan surge - A US general explains why the Iraq model doesn't apply."

Olsen provides an excellent overview of the situation, and does so in probably the most succinct way possible considering the complexity of the issues. So I'll quote him at length in order to convey the whole picture:

"Iraq is like New York State: both feature mostly urban populations with dominant capitals. Pacify the Big Apple and you pacify the whole state; pacify Baghdad and you pacify Iraq. But Afghanistan is more like Alaska: both have rural populations with capital cities far removed from large, mountainous regions. Baghdad alone accounts for 7 million Iraqis – about one-quarter of the population. In Afghanistan, barely one-tenth of the population lives in the five largest cities. Because Baghdad is the political and socioeconomic center of the nation, the calming effect of the surge there reverberated across the country. But there is no such city in Afghanistan.

"Living with the people" in Afghanistan will require a completely different configuration. It would require small numbers of US soldiers living in countless small villages, where they'd be unable to support each other in emergencies. And since only about 20 percent of Afghanistan's roads are paved, quick-reaction forces would slow to a crawl, especially in the mountains and in bad weather.

If protecting the population is what's needed to reverse recent Taliban successes, then the best way to do so is through local, small-scale policing where the Taliban has been most successful: in small towns and villages. But the brigades at the heart of the coming surge are insufficient in number and they're not organized, trained, or equipped to do this kind of policing. The mission of the surge force needs to be rethought, with a primary focus on achieving the ability to build effective local security forces."

The surge in Iraq centered troop increases and operations very heavily on Baghdad. The capital city was long the center of insurgent violence, and US commanders knew well that if they could pacify Baghdad, it would have massive effects throughout the country.

As Olsen points out, Afghanistan is pretty much the opposite of Iraq in terms of population distribution. It also has a population of almost 33 million, compared to Iraq's 29 million. Therefore, the US military must find a way to protect a larger, much more dispersed population, with a fraction of the funding and manpower that was available in Iraq even before the surge.

Faced with such an ominous challenge, what does Olsen suggest?

"What has not been tried (because it has been judged too painstaking) is a systematic effort to address problems in the Pashtun areas on a village-by-village, tribe-by-tribe basis. The tools of such an approach are readily available. They include precisely planned and executed military operations to attack extremist networks without killing innocent civilians, microloans, and microgrants that go directly to meet the needs of local markets and small enterprises (which could avoid the corruption that besets the national governments), and reconciliation agreements that target the interests of small groups and recognize the pitfalls associated with applying broad labels ("Taliban," "militant," "drug cartel," and the like)."

This is in line with a recently-announced change in tactics, which will shift development efforts, discussion, and negotiation away from the national level and toward more local institutions. This is partly a response to the rampant corruption in Kabul, and partly a recognition that historically political power in Afghanistan has been decentralized to a large degree.

The approach presented by Olsen is essentially classic counterinsurgency warfare. The main efforts are concentrated on providing protection for the local population, building trust, and providing basic needs for civilians. These efforts are supported by "offensive" actions -- described by Olsen as "...precisely planned and executed military operations to attack extremist networks without killing innocent civilians." These operations apply pressure to the insurgency and attempt to seize the initiative by forcing insurgents into a defensive posture.

Relating this to the previously-mentioned debate between counterinsurgency (COIN) and counterterrorism (CT), the method proposed by Olsen is much more comprehensive than simple CT operations. In a conflict centered on CT strategies, the primary aim would be elimination of enemy soldiers, weapons, and support structures. Progress would likely be measured by the number of insurgents killed or a similar metric -- the infamous "body counts" of Vietnam and Iraq which were found to reveal virtually nothing about actual progress being made. Counterterrorism strips away most of the vital population-centric components of COIN, leaving only part of an effective strategy.

Thankfully it appears the Obama administration is leaning toward a more robust COIN model for Afghanistan. However, as General Olsen points out, there are more than a few unique challenges in Afghanistan not previously encountered by US forces. Just as important as troop levels and the correct choice of strategic approach will be the adaptability of US forces on the ground as they are continually presented with the new and unexpected.

h/t to Kings of War