Afghanistan Update

I want to take a moment to update and clarify some points from my last post on Afghanistan. In that post, I talked about the ongoing debate in the White House whether counterterrorist (CT) or counterinsurgency (COIN) operations should form the basis of America's approach in Afghanistan.

First, I want to clarify that the Obama administration should not be against CT operations. CT operations play an important role within the wider framework of COIN. What is important is that CT operations outside of the context of a broader COIN strategy are likely to alienate the Afghan population and aid the creation of a stronger insurgent Taliban/al-Qaeda force.

Also, I want to make it clear that although COIN operations are very demanding in terms of resources, manpower, and time, these shortcomings must be compared not to an ideal situation but to the available alternatives. While CT operations would require less manpower and less resources, this comes at the expense of effectiveness. Also, the idea that CT is "faster" is misleading. As mentioned above, adopting a CT strategy would likely lead to a worsening security situation in Afghanistan.

Therefore, the alternative to an extended COIN campaign is not a fast, successful CT campaign, but rather a CT campaign that is very likely to fail. How long a CT campaign would take would depend on how long America decided to continue with its failed endeavor. Depending on domestic opinion, an unstable and violent Afghanistan could lead to fast withdrawal or even a longer commitment than COIN operations.

Lastly Americans should keep in mind that even after years of dedicated, well-funded COIN efforts there is no guarantee of victory. Unfortunately, the record of large, conventional armies against insurgencies throughout history is not good at all. The U.S. military's brightest counterinsurgency theorists and practitioners -- John Nagl, David Kilcullen, Andrew Exum, Robert Kaplan, and Thomas Ricks, among others -- have clearly and repeatedly said that there is still a good chance we will lose the war.

Pundits and politicians who know virtually nothing about the military challenges of the war are fond of pointing to Iraq as proof that the US can win counterinsurgency wars. Within the military establishment, things are not seen as being so clear. While the switch to COIN doctrine by Gen Petraeus in Iraq in 2007 is credited with improving the security situation, America also got very lucky. Moqtada al-Sadr, the most powerful Shiite militia leader, declared a unilateral ceasefire. Sunni militias decided they had had enough with destructive foreign terrorists, and became willing to work with the Americans. These opportunities were exploited by smart, resourceful military leaders, who deserve some credit. However, they must be recognized as lucky opportunities.

In order to prevail in Afghanistan, we will need to utilize the lessons learned over years of recent counterinsurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan. Just as important, we need to remember that the alternative to difficult COIN operations is not easy CT operations, but ineffective CT operations. With enough hard work and a little bit of luck, there is still a chance the story of Afghanistan will have a happy ending.