COIN or CT?

A new article in Slate by Fred Kaplan discusses a very important choice that will be made soon by the Obama administration. Before the NATO conference in Strasbourg, France taking place in a week, Obama and his top commanders must decide whether the war in Afghanistan will be conducted as a counterterrorist (CT) or counterinsurgency (COIN) conflict.

Although to most Americans these two approaches may sound alike, they are in fact very different. They reflect different priorities and objectives, and would have extremely different effects. CT operations emphasize direct "kinetic" (meaning combat) operations to kill or capture the enemy. On the other hand, COIN operations are all about winning the support of the population, in order to deny the enemy much-needed support among civilians. While active "terrorist hunting" still plays a role in COIN, it is conducted mostly to protect and win the support of the local population.

Look at Iraq, for example. For years, the American military concentrated on hunting down insurgent leaders, with most operations aimed at killing insurgents or destroying their bases and arms caches. This approach is a fair example of counter-terrorism. Of course, despite killing thousands of insurgents and achieving countless tactical victories, the insurgency continued to grow and become more deadly.

Then in 2007 there was a revolution of sorts, lead by General David Petraeus, with the goal of implementing counterinsurgency doctrine in Iraq. Petraeus authored a military manual on COIN, and started moving the troops out of large, isolated bases. Scattered among the Iraqi population in smaller bases, American forces were better able to protect the people and gain their trust. Combined with efforts to develop economic infrastructure and provide for the needs of the Iraqi people, this new COIN strategy turned the tide against the insurgents.

Now there are many in the Obama administration, led by Vice President Joe Biden, arguing that the same counterterrorist strategy which failed in Iraq should be implemented in Afghanistan. Biden argues that the primary goal of the US in Afghanistan is to destroy al Qaeda. Therefore, the military should concentrate on direct attacks against the insurgent forces that protect and associate with al Qaeda.

On the other side are those who seek to implement a counterinsurgency strategy. They argue that the only way to defeat the Taliban and secure Afghanistan against devolving back into a terrorist's paradise is to win over the Afghan population. They call for extensive development projects and a larger effort to protect Afghans from the Taliban. COIN proponents seek to take the general principles that proved effective in Iraq, and use them to conduct a smarter war in Afghanistan.

Counterinsurgency is not without its drawbacks. The more complex operations of COIN require more boots on the ground and more funding. COIN is also a slower process -- it could take a decade to achieve victory. Lastly, even the most vocal proponents of COIN say that it will be a difficult process. Victory is not assured, but could be achieved with sufficient dedication.

Despite these drawbacks, the Obama administration should resist the urge to go for the "quick and easy" option of the counterterrorism model. Experience shows that CT is largely ineffective against an insurgency with substantial local support. Simply killing more Taliban fighters won't work, since they are able to recruit members even faster. Even more importantly, most of the Taliban and al Qaeda's top-level leadership has fled across the border to Pakistan. Since the US cannot send troops into Pakistan without causing a massive international incident, CT operations could not touch these leaders.

COIN operations, on the other hand, would build up the Afghan population, making them stronger and more supportive of US efforts. Since Taliban and al Qaeda elements hiding in Pakistan cannot be directly attacked, the best option is to weaken their support and influence among Afghans through COIN.

In addition, the US is ultimately responsible for the fate of the people of Afghanistan. Even if CT operations managed to sufficiently cripple al Qaeda, without COIN there would be no foundation for building a stable nation. Ending the war after CT operations against al Qaeda would open the door to another Taliban conquest and a return to the 2001 status quo.

The Obama administration must disregard myopic political pressures and make the right choice for Afghanistan. If we cannot gain the support of the Afghan population and build a stable government capable of defending itself against the Taliban, our efforts since 2001 will have been for nothing. Fighting the war the right way in Afghanistan will not be easy, but we owe it to ourselves and the Afghan people to try our best.