What Really Happened In South Ossetia

A quick (though necessarily incomplete) background of the situation in South Ossetia and the complex history of the region is necessary to understand the roots of the conflict. When the Soviet Union collapsed, the Georgian provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia -- both populated by groups ethnically, culturally, and linguistically different from Georgians -- rebelled against the government in Tbilisi, seeking independence. The Georgian government was able to prevent all-out secession by the two provinces, but could not bring the regions totally under its control.

In 1992, a ceasefire was declared and a peacekeeping force of Russians, Ossetians, and Georgians was assembled under a legal agreement between the parties, to prevent further outbreaks of violence. For more than a decade after the ceasefire, things were relatively quiet in South Ossetia. Tensions between Russia and Georgia began to increase in the past few years, however, as Georgia became more aligned with NATO and the United States, and more opposed to Russian influence. Russia responded by increasing support for the separatist groups in the breakaway provinces, offering Russian citizenship to Ossetians, and taking a hard line against the pro-Western Georgian government of Mikhail Saakashvili.

After the 1992 ceasefire, South Ossetia received little support from the Georgian government, and became a de facto protectorate and beneficiary of Russia. Most South Ossetians hold Russian passports, receive government benefits from the Russian government, and are highly integrated into the Russian economy. In many ways, the people of South Ossetia are as much a part of Russia as their relatives across the border in the Russian province of North Ossetia.

Something like 99 percent of South Ossetians -- who share more in common with Iranians linguistically, ethnically, and culturally than they do with Georgians -- want independence from Georgia. South Ossetia is part of Georgia (and not Russia) largely by historical accident, and Ossetians share little in common with the rest of the Georgian nation.

The situation in Ossetia is in many ways comparable to that in Kosovo, with an ethnically and linguistically distinct group seeking independence from a larger nation. When NATO backed Kosovo's moves for independence, Russia warned that dangerous precedents were being set. We are now seeing how true that is, as Russia supports its own "Kosovo" as it seeks independence and self-determination.

The standard media narrative surrounding the South Ossetian conflict is something along these lines: Russia invades Georgia, Russia kills civilians, little Georgia is generally victimized by big, evil Russia. It seems that the Western press is so used to vilifying Russia that they cannot see the much more complicated reality. This reality is that, while Russia's motives in South Ossetia are not entirely selfless or humanitarian, the war and its tragedies are largely the fault of Georgian president Mikheil Saakashvili.

There are no "good guys" in this war. By launching a massive assault on Tskhinvali on August 7, Georgia breached a long-standing, legally-established ceasefire and attacked legitimately-placed Russian peacekeepers. The assault on Tskhinvali, which was launched immediately after Saakashvili deceptively agreed to a ceasefire with the South Ossetian separatists, included massive, indiscriminate bombardment of the entire city with artillery and rockets. The civilian casualties caused by the initial Georgian attack did not receive nearly as much coverage as the Russian response (largely because the international media did not yet have a significant presence in Ossetia), but the Georgian attack was at least as devastating in terms of civilian suffering as the Russian response.

After the initial assault on Tskhinvali, Russian reinforcements quickly regained control of the city and pushed the Georgian forces out of South Ossetia. A series of Russian air attacks took out military airfields, bases, communications infrastructure, factories, and other military assets in the central city of Gori, the port city of Poti, and elsewhere in Georgia. Unfortunately, the media focused on the few cases in which Russian airstrikes missed their targets and hit civilians. This is somewhat ironic coming from the same media establishment that totally disregards civilian casualties in Iraq and Afghanistan as unavoidable and insignificant "collateral damage".

In attacking South Ossetia, it seems Saakashvili sought to improve his political situation by restoring Georgian authority in the breakaway province, but he ended up overplaying his hand horribly. He underestimated the Russian response and overestimated Western support once shots were fired. The initial bombardment of Tskhinvali killed civilians in an indiscriminate manner, and may fit the definition of a war crime. From a political standpoint, Russia had little choice but to respond forcefully.

The Western press seems obsessed with accusing the Russian military with acting in a "disproportionate" manner, especially for attacking Georgian military assets on the Black Sea coast and elsewhere outside of South Ossetia. If the media knew anything about the fundamentals of warfare, they would know that there is no "proportion" in war. The objective in war is always the complete destruction of the enemy's warmaking capability. This may sound harsh, but it is in reality necessary, since failure to seek this ultimate objective can result in long, protracted, and ultimately more damaging wars in which neither side can gain a decisive advantage.

Targeting of non-combatants and non-military targets should always be prohibited, but this is not a matter of "proportion", it is a matter of limiting attacks to military targets. In truth, Russia's fast and decisive response likely spared further bloodshed, since any half-way "proportionate" response would have left the Georgian military intact and allowed fighting to continue much longer. This talk of Russian excess seems even more strange in light of the fact that the Georgian forces (numbering at least 40,000) have outnumbered the Russian forces (numbering 30,000 at most) all throughout the conflict.

It should also be noted that mere hours after the Georgian military began bombarding Tskhinvali, Russia brought the issue before an emergency meeting of the UN Security Council, seeking an immediate ceasefire and end to the fighting. The United States and Britain blocked the resolution, objecting to language in the declaration that would condemn the "use of military force" by either side, leaving Russia with little option but to respond to the Georgian attack. In essence, Russia tried to end the war before it became a war, and Georgia's allies in the UN rejected the peace proposal.

The main motives and goals of each side (in no particular order) going into the conflict were as follows:

Georgia:
Secure the separatist province that has been a thorn in Saakashvili's side for some time.
Remove Russian influence from South Ossetia by ousting the Moscow-backed separatist authority.
Show the US and NATO that Georgia is capable of controlling its own territory. (Georgia is seeking NATO membership.)

In the end, Saakashvili was pushed out of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, his military is in ruins, and his political position suffered greatly. He sought to flex his muscles against Russian influence, regain control of Ossetia, and show himself a strong leader. He accomplished much the opposite.

Russia:
Respond to Georgian aggression against peacekeepers in South Ossetia.
Defend Ossetians (who hold Russian citizenship) and restore the legally-established status quo.
Send a message regarding aggressive NATO encroachment on Russia's borders.
Assert Russia's dominant role in the region.

Russian president Dmitry Medvedev responded quickly and decisively to the Georgian attack, defended Russian citizens, and made clear that Russia would not tolerate attacks against its troops and citizens. The Russian response quickly routed the numerically-superior Georgian forces, destroyed Georgian military infrastructure, and secured Russian influence in both Ossetia and Abkhazia. Notwithstanding the West's demonization of Russia's every move, Russia turned the war to their advantage quite adeptly.