Obama vs. The Unwashed Masses

"Last week, around the same time President Obama was giving his health-care speech to Congress, I was in Washington to interview some administration officials for an upcoming story in Esquire. They were so damn positive. And hardworking. And energetic — the kinds of people who actually wake up at dawn to go running just so they can get to the office by 7:30, who eat salads and read only useful books. They don't watch television. They never drink more than a glass or two of wine. Sometimes they might indulge in a social beer, but it really is a social beer."

Thus Josh Koster -- a truly shameless, fawning sycophant if there ever was one -- begins his ridiculous tirade against those who dare oppose Obama and his legions of utterly perfect bureaucrats. These positive people, Koster explains, are dumbfounded by the medieval, hateful hordes of the opposition who, in Koster's words, "would rather do the wrong thing than do what is good for them."

To be sure, just like any mass protest, 9/12 brought out more than a few kooks. The media of course eagerly captured every hyperbolic Hitler-reference and every ranting apocalyptic prophet. The unfortunate result of these overzealous and less-than-rational displays is that the pro-Obama media machine has been given ample ammunition to discredit all those opposed to Obama's grand vision for a new America.

For those like Koster, the popular culture consensus, fed by this media narrative, is that support for European-style national health care is the only option for rational, civilized people. Those expressing doubt over the feasibility or cost of such a system are instantly branded as shills for the evil insurance companies or as reactionary, racist yokels. Never mind that these evil insurance companies stand to gain huge profits and are among Obamacare's biggest supporters. Never mind that establishing such an immense social welfare program without affecting the deficit (as promised by Obama) is virtually impossible.

Unburdened by such silly concerns, Koster outlines the brilliant strategy of Obama's infallible czars:

"...they really don't want to force anybody to do things. They believe in this idea of "libertarian paternalism," which means they'll put the fruits and veggies right there at eye level by the counter and put the chips and sugary sodas way up on the top shelf. They're not going to force you to pick the public option, [..] they're going to use "choice architecture" to "nudge" you toward what is obviously good for you."

It is unfortunate that Koster is so enamored with the Obama administration's technocratic social engineering that he fails to recognize that this concept of "libertarian" government control is completely contradictory and nonsensical. Apparently, we are to believe that Obama's "public option" will remain a passive and beneficial option for those in need, never to expand or cost taxpayers a dime. In fact, Koster thinks we ought to be thankful that despite our obvious incompetence and self-destructive behavior, daddy government is willing to give us a loving "nudge" toward contented serfdom.

Just in case it was not abundantly clear that all non-Democrats are backwards sociopaths, Koster finally reveals that opponents of Obama are in fact slavery-loving Confederate sympathizers (no, really):

"It's no accident that much of this impulse comes from the southern states, which recent polls suggest are virtually united in their opposition to President Obama. After all, this is the region that fought government intrusion upon its freedoms by forming its own government to intrude upon its freedoms, that imposed the Fugitive Slave Law on other states in the name of states' rights, that fought for slavery in the name of liberty."

If one is to avoid being branded as a hateful and ignorant Confederate, Obama's ridiculous concept of "libertarian paternalism" must be embraced unquestioningly. Doubts about the fiscal feasibility of Obama's health care insurance reforms must not be voiced. The childish citizenry must not dare suggest that unintended consequences might arise from these massive changes to the health care industry.

That political discourse in America has sunk this low is truly tragic. If this piece of inane garbage is at all indicative of the beliefs of the Democratic party or President Obama -- and I fear that it may be -- things will be getting much worse before they get better.

Afghanistan: A Strategic Analysis

Early Thursday morning, approximately 4,000 Marines from the 2nd Marine Expeditionary Brigade moved into the Taliban-controlled Helmand River valley in southern Afghanistan. This marked the beginning of the first large-scale operation in Afghanistan to implement a new set of counterinsurgency (COIN) practices -- practices adapted from General David Petraeus' Iraq "surge" strategy.

The COIN strategy at the center of this new operation concentrates on building economic and political infrastructure, protecting the Afghan population, and establishing a working relationship between the people of Helmand and the Afghan government. Whereas the emphasis was once on "kinetic" operations targeting Taliban forces, US forces are now to be primarily concerned with assisting and protecting the Afghan people rather than hunting the enemy. In order to do this, Marine units will move into small outposts, dispersed among the population, much like they did in Baghdad during the 2007 surge.

Media accounts have thus far focused mainly on the similarities between the new operation and the successful Iraq surge of 2007. However, the immense geographical and political differences between Iraq and Afghanistan will play a greater role in determining the outcome of this operation.

In Iraq, concentrated counterinsurgency efforts in the central hub of Baghdad had the effect of spreading stability throughout the country. Afghanistan, on the other hand, has no such urban center where COIN efforts can be concentrated. The country's harsh mountainous landscape also serves to isolate communities from each other in a way not seen in Iraq. Less than 10 percent of the nation's population lives in large cities, and as a result stabilization efforts require greater troop numbers, more dispersed throughout the country.

The enemy in Afghanistan is also quite different from that in Iraq. The Iraqi insurgency was highly fractured -- consisting of many opposing Sunni and Shiite militias and foreign terrorist elements. The US military's ability to leverage hostilities between these groups (in the form of the Anbar Awakening, where Sunni militants turned against foreign terrorist elements) was central to the success of the surge.

In contrast, the Afghan Taliban has acted for some time in Helmand as a de facto government, after forcing government officials and police out of the area. This grants them a unique degree of legitimacy and support among the population not enjoyed by Iraq's militant factions. Whether Afghan citizens' support for the Taliban is merely a begrudging product of fear, or willing support, is hotly contested among experts.

The US military, however, is counting on the willingness of the Afghan people to turn against the Taliban once US forces bring some degree of stability and progress. Whatever the Afghan peoples' attitudes toward the Taliban, winning their support will also require tangible improvement in the Afghan government, which is perceived as hopelessly corrupt and ineffective.

The challenges presented by Afghanistan are uniquely daunting. The prospect of success will depend greatly on US forces' ability to quickly and effectively adapt strategies to unforseen circumstances and unique challenges. In a nation more populous and geographically dispersed than Iraq, and with only a fraction of the manpower, victory in Afghanistan is far from certain. In such a fight, a firm understanding of the enemy, the underlying politics, and the geography can mean the difference between victory and defeat.

Calling North Korea's Bluff

Kim Jong-Il, "Dear Leader" of the backwards, bellicose, dystopian dictatorship that has held its southern neighbor hostage for half a century, is truly unique in his twisted ingenuity. He defied the international community's resolutions, demands and threats for decades, while extracting concessions from the world's most powerful nations. He developed nuclear weapons, conducted ballistic missile tests, and openly threatened other nations. He is among the world's most dangerous proliferators of weapons of mass destruction, if not the most dangerous. Despite all this, Kim and his pathetically stagnant nation remain, for all practical purposes, untouchable.

In response to North Korea's most recent bout of nuclear tests and threats, hawks in Washington are once again calling for a hard, unforgiving approach. The Wall Street Journal's Gordon G. Chang recently gave voice to these hawkish sentiments in his article "How to Stop North Korea's Weapons Proliferation". According to Chang, North Korea's recent renunciation of the 1953 armistice, which in effect ended the Korean War, means that the US and North Korea are once again technically belligerents at war. This gives the United States legal standing to interdict North Korean vessels -- specifically the Kang Nam, an infamous proliferating ship now being trailed by the US Navy.

Chang proposes that rather than passively watching the Kang Nam unload its illegal goods, the US Navy should board it and seize its crew and cargo -- an approach that North Korea already said it would consider to be an "act of war". So once again the US is presented with a now-familiar choice: allow Kim Jong-Il to thumb his nose at the world, or risk the resumption of war on the Korean peninsula.

Beneath all the posturing and blustering rhetoric, the reality is this: as long as Kim's masses of artillery (and WMDs) stand ready to incinerate the bustling city of Seoul with its 10 million inhabitants, the aggressive proposals of Chang and countless other frustrated hawks will remain nothing more than dangerous fantasies. No matter how many nuclear tests Kim conducts, the United States is unwilling to call his bluff and risk not only war, but the slaughter of millions of South Korean civilians.

It is hard to imagine that Chang is unaware of this fundamental reality of US-North Korean relations. Nevertheless, he carefully plans this "legally justified" attack on the Kang Nam, conveniently omitting any mention of the catastrophic result that could follow.

Perhaps most disturbing is Chang's concluding remark: "North Korea, after all, has resumed the Korean War." In the end it seems that Chang is prepared to justify such a risk with a technicality. The Korean People's Army declared that it would "not be bound" by the 1953 armistice; therefore we have license to provoke the mass slaughter of millions.

US-North Korean relations are largely based on the unfortunate fact that Kim Jong-Il holds the city of Seoul hostage. As long as North Korea holds this trump card, talk by US hawks of naval seizures, attacks on nuclear facilities, or blockades is foolish. This is even truer because Kim very well may not be bluffing -- the insulated, eccentric leader's mental health has been called into question more than once.

As tensions with North Korea inevitably continue to escalate in the coming weeks, we must be careful to ensure that the reckless aggression of hawks like Chang does not gain traction. Though our inability to stem North Korean belligerence may be frustrating, it is certainly preferable to the extreme risk of calling a madman's bluff.

Biggest Tax in US History?

According to this Wall Street Journal opinion piece, the cap-and-trade carbon emission restriction system being pushed through Congress now by Democrats will be the single biggest tax in US history. The Congressional Budget Office estimated that the bill -- commonly called the Waxman-Markey bill -- would cost only $175 a year by 2020, yet openly acknowledged that this estimate did not even attempt to estimate the broader economic effects of such a massive regulation-and-taxation system. Similarly, the CBO used unrealistic tax estimates, ignoring the way in which the program is designed to ratchet up taxes and decrease carbon emission caps over time.

More comprehensive analysis by the Heritage Foundation found that the bill would have an enormous effect on economic growth, costing $1,870 for a family of four in 2020 and up to $6,800 for a family of four in 2035. In addition, the program -- which is in reality a severe tax on all energy consumption and therefore all economic activity -- is expected to dramatically slow economic growth. Many industrial sectors will be hard hit by the massive new tax, as they are forced to increase prices, decrease production, and most probably lay off some of their workers. As the economy slows under the weight of this massive new taxation system, gas and electricity prices will rise dramatically even as unemployment rises.

Jim Lindgren at The Volokh Conspiracy points out that even with these horrible effects on the economy, the decrease in carbon emissions due to the program will fail utterly to make a difference in the big picture of global warming. Lindgren compares the bill to the disastrous Smoot-Hawley bill of 1930, which imposed large tariffs and is widely recognized to have made the Great Depression much worse. In fact, as Lindgren points out, the bill will act much like an internal tariff, and will likely have even more serious effects than the Smoot-Hawley bill. With the economy still suffering, the last thing Americans need is an expensive, harmful, and ineffective federal program that sabotages the economy for the sake of environmental posturing.

Why Iran Matters

The unrest of the past few days in Iran has seized center stage in world politics, as countless people throughout the world become involved in supporting the Iranian protesters' cause. It is clear that events in Iran captured the imagination of the world, but what is less clear is why these events are truly important to Americans and other non-Iranians.

Recent events in Iran are important to us for at least two reasons. First, they represent a centuries-old struggle between liberty and oppression. Of course, Mir-Hussein Moussavi, the Iranian "reform" candidate championed by many Iranian protesters, is far from a liberal in the western sense. He has a solid record of supporting the strict structure of the Islamic republic.

However, he is far more pro-liberty than Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, promising reforms in women's rights and moves toward general (though gradual) modernization. The struggle of the Iranian people to have their votes counted -- and to have a say in their government -- should be defended even if their chosen candidate is less than perfect. The election in Iran was far from free or open, and there is good reason to question its legitimacy. What is most important is not who the Iranian people choose, but that they are defending their right to make that choice.

Less obvious and yet more important to us is what the Iranian protests show us about the changing nature of political power and dissent in the modern world. An excellent piece on the blog Journal Squared compares the technologically-empowered ferocity of the Iranian movement with the 1999 Seattle WTO protests. The Seattle protests made headlines for activists' innovative and highly effective use of technology to organize and communicate. The world was shocked by their ability to outsmart and overpower better-funded, better-armed, and better-trained authorities.

This new form of "networked, anonymous and decentralized protest movement" quickly adapts and ends up overwhelming political leaders. The result is either the collapse of centralized leadership ability or frenzied overreaction by authorities -- either outcome is beneficial to the cause of the protesters.

The RAND Corporation, one of the foremost defense policy think tanks in the United States, called this technologically-enabled form of resistance "netwar", and identified it as among the greatest threats to modern governments. Short for "networked warfare", RAND says that this new style of conflict, "depends heavily on information and communications technology, nonhierarchical organization, and tactics that are distinctly different from previous forms of civil-society conflicts."

Compared to older forms of protest and resistance, netwar is vastly more effective at disrupting the mechanisms of state power and undermining the legitimacy of targeted organizations. Using simple technologies like mobile phones and social media (i.e. twitter, etc), protesters can quickly organize actions (demonstrations, riots, attacks on specific entities, etc), react to police movements, and build vast global support structures.

The Iranian election is demonstrating how greatly these tactics have advanced with the advancement and spread of communications technology. Before the election, few experts predicted any kind of sizeable reaction by the Iranian people. Then, beginning with the declaration of victory by Ahmadinejad, a massive resistance movement emerged with unprecedented speed and reach. Within hours of the results being announced, a global network of support began forming.

When the Iranian government attempted to cut communications and isolate the dissidents, thousands of people throughout the world began helping the effort: setting up proxies to circumvent government filters, attacking government websites, and keeping lines of communication open despite the best efforts of the Iranian state. Much like in open-source software development, the distributed and coordinated efforts of these people converged to form a highly effective product.

Iranian students and dissidents massed by the hundreds of thousands and more in cities throughout Iran with little advance notice, empowered by new communication technologies. Movements of pro-Ahmadinejad militias, police, and military forces were constantly relayed among protesters. International journalists were banned from covering the protests, and protesters filled the information gap in near real-time with thousands of pictures, videos, and text accounts of events on the ground.

According to Col. John Boyd, one of the foremost warfare theorists of our time, conflict is broadly explained by a cyclical process called the OODA loop. In this process, agents in a conflict (whether they are generals commanding armies or fighter pilots flying planes) first Observe, then Orient themselves, then Decide on a course of action, and then finally Act.

For example, a fighter pilot (the theory was originally devised to describe aerial combat) must first observe his surroundings, orient himself in relation to the enemy and other relevant considerations, decide on the best course of action (speed up, slow down, climb, dive, etc), and finally act on that decision. This action will produce a new set of circumstances to be observed, and the cycle begins again. Boyd said that the agent in a conflict who can most quickly cycle through this OODA loop will gain a decisive advantage over his enemy, since he will be able to seize the initiative and dictate the terms of the fight. This is often termed "getting inside" the enemy's OODA loop, since one can observe and act many times while the enemy completes only one observation-action cycle.

In Iran, protesters empowered by modern communications technology are able to "get inside" the OODA loop of state forces by virtue of their decentralized and well-connected nature. Government forces must wait while information travels up to superiors and decisions travel down the chain of command. However, "netwarriors" can individually assess the situation (using technologically-delivered information) and react quickly to changing circumstances. Furthermore, the sheer number of individuals involved in such a decentralized effort result in remarkably fast and creative problem-solving abilities.

Thus we see that the protests in Iran are really the next step in the development of a revolutionary new political reality. In this new reality, barriers to communication and organization are torn down. Like-minded individuals can quickly build powerful ad hoc organizations that span the globe. The sluggish structures of the government are overwhelmed by fast, agile, infinitely flexible networks.

In short, the most basic rules of political power and control are being undermined and replaced with a more open, decentralized model of cooperation. The technologies driving this trend toward decentralized empowerment are only becoming more potent and ubiquitous. No matter what ends up happening in Iran, netwar is here to stay.

First Thoughts on The Iranian Liberal Movement

Over the past few days, we have learned a great deal about the nature of our technologically-connected world. The most interesting lessons learned do not depend on whether the Iranian election was rigged, or who ends up as President of Iran. What is most remarkable is the way in which new structures of communication and cooperation were quickly developed over vast distances to empower the Iranian liberal movement.

In 1994 the Zapatista Army of National Liberation, or EZLN, declared war against the Mexican government and took up the cause of southern Mexico's poor indigenous people. What made their "mini-revolution" so notable was their use of the internet to gain international exposure and support for their cause. Millions of people worldwide learned of the plight of these poverty-stricken people, and a mass support movement emerged. The EZLN's cause was heralded as the first information age revolution. Since then, countless political movements from Amnesty International to al Qaeda have utilized the internet to connect globally. Looking at recent events in Iran, it seems the technologically-primitive EZLN model of information-age revolution has been taken to astounding new levels.

Fifteen years later, the Iranian liberal movement's explosion onto the world stage shows us how far we have progressed. Anyone with internet access can receive real-time updates from scores of Iranian students and activists, including photos and videos. Despite the Iranian government's ban on foreign journalists, virtually every rally and riot from Tehran to Tabriz is videotaped and documented from multiple perspectives. Every student in Iran with a cell phone, computer, or camera can easily disseminate information to millions of people all over the globe, in an instant. Supporters of the liberal cause are setting up proxies by the hundreds or thousands, so Iranians can circumvent government bans and continue to communicate with the outside world. Efforts by the Iranian government to isolate Tehran by excluding the media and shutting down phone systems largely failed due to the resilience and inventiveness of those supporting the Iranian opposition's cause.

According to most mainstream media experts, the unrest in Iran has little chance of truly challenging Ahmadinejad's hold on power. Pre-election polls showed that despite strong support for reform candidate Mir-Hussein Mousavi among urban residents and students, Ahmadinejad was more widely supported throughout the whole of Iran. You certainly wouldn't know this from the constant stream of news on twitter, which is decidedly anti-Ahmadinejad and often hyperbolic. Naturally, the tech-savvy, English-speaking students in Iran's cities dominate the narrative due to the silence of the rural, conservative supporters of Ahmadinejad. However, the movement has already exceeded all expectations in terms of size and intensity. The experts may very well be wrong.

What is most revolutionary about this convergence of technology and political action is that even if only a minority of Iranians really oppose Ahmadinejad, they have managed to set the world afire with their passionate and determined response to injustice. This whole phenomenon is no less remarkable -- and may actually be more remarkable -- if it is really the work of a well-connected minority of smart, resourceful Iranian students and urban liberals. There is no doubt that millions of Iranians have taken to the streets against Ahmadinejad, and that this unrest must be taken seriously. Whether it can challenge the very legitimacy of the Iranian government, on the other hand, is yet to be seen.

Iran Exploding?

The official re-election of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, despite massive voter turnout for the opposition candidate Mir-Hussein Mousavi, has sparked massive riots and demonstrations in Iran. There are reports that Mousavi was arrested, and that Tehran is being isolated from the rest of Iran (no phone calls, etc).

While it is still early and therefore difficult to separate the truth from the rumors, it is clear that there are obvious irregularities in the voting. Iranians, including Mousavi, claim that the vote was clearly rigged in favor of Ahmadinejad, citing numerous exclusion tactics and outright fabrication of votes.

While I can't confirm the accuracy of these numbers, Tehran Bureau has some interesting analysis of the voting results. Apparently the official count of votes consistently maintained a certain balance, with Ahmadinejad receiving twice as many votes as Mousavi, to within 99.95 percent accuracy. This means that as millions of people voted, Ahmadinejad always maintained precisely twice as many votes as Mousavi. Clearly, the results of a real election would be much less orderly and predictable -- there should be substantial changes in the ratio of votes as results come in.

There are also many videos and pictures showing up on the internet of the riots. I found this one to be the most impressive in terms of sheer numbers. Of course the Iranian government is responding very forcefully, attempting to crush the dissenters. It is hard to predict how serious these demonstrations could get -- they are already the largest since the massive student demonstrations 10 years ago.