New Tactics, More Casualties

The Washington Post reported yesterday that April was the deadliest month for U.S. soldiers thus far in the war in Iraq, with at least 104 American troops reported killed. This has brought the total number of U.S. deaths to over 3350, and has led to an increase in domestic opposition to the war among those who see the high numbers as indicating the failure of the new "surge" security plan.

While those opposing the war cannot be blamed for taking these increased casualties as a further reason for American withdrawal, it should be noted that this increase was by no means unexpected -- it is a direct, predicted result of the new tactics being used by American troops in Baghdad. More than just increasing the number of troops on the ground, the new counterinsurgency tactics adopted by General Petraeus have moved American troops out of heavily-fortified "mega-bases" and into smaller patrol bases throughout Baghdad.

As many others have pointed out, the reasoning behind this change in tactics is theoretically sound, since a primary aim of counterinsurgency is gaining the trust and support of the populace. By dispersing U.S. troops throughout the city in smaller numbers, closer to the Iraqi people, Gen. Petraeus hopes to achieve a number of goals: to enhance security through a more visible, active American presence; to gain the trust of the Iraqi people by living among them; and to commit troops to neighborhoods that they can learn well and more effectively protect.

In bringing about these changes, Petraeus is finally replacing the old, ineffective methods of the U.S. forces with tried-and-true counterinsurgency methods. The trade-off that accompanies this change in tactics, however, is that American troops become much more vulnerable as they move into the city and live amongst the Iraqi people. While casualties can be expected to increase in the short term, the hope is that the more effective methods being utilized now will actually decrease casualties in the long term.

Whether or not this gamble will work out will only be revealed in time. A number of analysts believe that this change in tactics, while certainly reflecting much more competent and experienced leadership, is "too little too late" given the larger situation in Iraq. What is certain is that the U.S. military, after more than 4 years of conflict, finally managed to implement some of the counterinsurgency tactics that should have been utilized from the very beginning. Exactly why the military brass failed to do so, and instead used outdated, highly ineffective (and predictably ineffective) methods, is not entirely clear.

In the meantime, the failure of the Bush administration to articulate the reasoning behind this change in tactics -- and the short-term costs of the change -- is likely to harm both the administration and the effort, as Americans conclude that the new strategy, rather than decreasing casualties and increasing security, is doing the opposite. It is hard to find fault with this conclusion, however, since the increase in casualties, even if temporary, is very real and worrisome to many Americans.

Furthermore, in this case the "commonsense", amateur analysis that more casualties equals failure is a point of view being adopted by many military analysts who say that the theoretical benefits of the strategy are unlikely to materialize due to the intensity of conflict. The time to adopt these tactics, they say, was back in 2003 when American forces were transitioning from the initial phase of the war into an occupation role.

UPDATE: There is a good piece in the New York Post by Ann Marlowe, called "French Lessons", which brings up the experiences of the French in Algeria, which inspired military theorist David Galula's ideas of counterinsurgency.

In his famous work "Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice", Galula outlines a method of counterinsurgency which calls for small, dispersed groups (usually of 10-15 men) to man patrol bases throughout the insurgents' operational area. While somewhat counterintuitive (it would seem to negate the occupier's advantage of numbers), the goal of this tactic is to inspire confidence in the government by maintaining stability, and to deny insurgents safe haven among the people. As long as forces are amassed in bases far from the people, there is little that can be done to root out insurgents from within the population; the counterinsurgent's advantage of numbers is negated by their inability to maintain control of the city. Galula's theory seeks to rectify this problem, and provide a workable framework for hindering insurgent activity.

If these tactics sound very familiar, it is because General Petraeus' ideas -- laid out in the Army's counterinsurgency field manual -- are drawn mostly from Galula's theory. As pointed out above, the most curious thing is that it took this long for the American military to adopt even remotely effective tactics.