Slaying the Hydra

As president Bush's new "surge" security plan for Iraq moves forward and Americans anxiously await signs of real progress in the violence-wracked nation, the question on everyone's mind is: Can the war in Iraq be won? Republican and Democratic partisans, as a rule, eschew any reasoned analysis of the situation in favor of talking-point recitations that support their political interests. Similarly, media opinion makers and televised talking heads seem more interested in political jockeying than clear, truthful analysis.

Even those who honestly set about the task of analyzing the current situation in Iraq find it surprisingly difficult to describe or define the chaotic interplay of sects, ideologies, and cynical political interests that characterizes a region that has been comically -- and quite accurately -- termed "Mess-o-potamia".

Unlike the clearly-defined conflicts of the past (such as World War II), the war in Iraq is a complex tangle of actors and interests with the most elusive of motivations. Even those segments of society most commonly referenced as cohesive groups, such as Iraqi Sunnis, are in fact highly disorganized and dynamic. Regarding Iraqi Sunnis, there are countless divisions between religious moderates and extremists, political collaborators and rejectionists, power-hungry opposing militias, and even al-Qaeda sympathizers.

Iraqi Shiites are no less divided, with various militias and ad hoc political alliances, Iranian connections, compromisers and virulently anti-Sunni groups, and self-interested political elites. Add to this the extensive foreign involvement, from Saudi and Pakistani jihadis to Iranian Revolutionary Guard agents to al-Qaeda elements, and it becomes clear that American forces are fighting not a single enemy or even a handful of enemies, but rather a decentralized jumble of forces that one expert has termed a "bazaar of violence".

One of the primary failures of the Bush administration in executing the war has been an apparent inability to grasp these complexities and their ramifications. Since the U.S. is fighting a totally decentralized, self propagating, constantly growing movement with countless economic, religious, and political dimensions, no number of "decapitation" attacks against insurgent leaders or neighborhood round-ups can halt the growing violence. Even the new counterinsurgency program of General Petraeus, which seeks to integrate political reconciliation with a larger and more aggressive military presence, will be hard-pressed to achieve substantial gains as long as the sources of destabilization and radicalization remain untouched.

Gen. Petraeus has openly stated that there is no military solution to the war in Iraq -- meaning the basis of stability and reconciliation must necessarily spring from political compromise -- however this observation does nothing to make such reconciliation more likely in the face of long-standing historical animosities and intractable political problems.

Since the belligerent parties in Iraq lack the unity and cohesion of more traditional forces, there is little basis for broad, effective political compromise. Even if Sunni and Shiite politicians in Baghdad managed to work out compromises to the country's most pressing political problems, it is unlikely most belligerents would accept these compromises. Since most insurgents in Iraq (with the exception of militias headed by government officials) are not centrally commanded and do not share the ideological and political views of the Iraqi government, Iraqi leaders are utterly incapable of influencing most of the fighting in the territory they nominally rule.

The result of all this is, unsurprisingly, a total lack of trust in an Iraqi government that cannot provide even the most basic security services. The new "surge" plan seeks to address this lack of legitimacy by decreasing violence in the capitol, so that progress can be made toward building effective, trusted Iraqi military and police forces. Once these forces are established, the currently-impotent leaders in the Green Zone will presumably gain legitimacy.

The problem with this plan is that, in a nation as divided as Iraq, the legitimacy-power relation becomes a "chicken or the egg" problem -- without legitimacy, the government cannot muster reliable, strong forces, and without these forces they cannot gain legitimacy. The surge plan aims to supplant American forces for Iraqi forces in order to build a foundation of legitimacy, but the decentralized insurgent hydra has proven resilient even against American firepower.

Saddam Hussein solved the legitimacy-power riddle, and thereby secured power, by substituting fear for legitimacy -- his iron-fisted, bloody policies made his power unquestionable, and thus won him unquestionable power. Obviously, such a strategy is incompatible with the primary goal of the U.S. in Iraq -- the establishment a democratic government. Because of this, American forces and the fledgling Iraqi state have set off into uncharted waters, and are yet to see if the divided, hostile society in Iraq can be bound by democratic institutions.

Thus far, the same fragmentation of the Iraqi populace (into countless warring factions and hostile sects) that hinders analysis has proven insurmountable to Iraqi and American politicians and military forces. Whether or not reconciliation in Baghdad proves attainable in the end, the declarations of politicians from the Green Zone may be incapable of affecting meaningful change. Unfortunately, while the situation in Iraq has no military solution, it also seems to lack a clear political solution.