Resolving the Iran Issue

As the deadline for the UN Security Council's demand for Iran to cease uranium enrichment activities passed on September 1, the issue of Iran's intentions and the probable response from Washington become more and more important. Having passed the deadline without ceasing its enrichment activities, Iran has exposed itself to possible sanctions, if the United States can push such a resolution through the Security Council over possible objections by Russia and/or China.

In the Bush administration and in most Washington circles, it is taken for granted that Iran's enrichment programs aim at covertly developing nuclear weaponry. Other governments throughout the world, whether because of their better standing with the Iranian regime or for other reasons, do not see the issue as so certain. There has been no evidence to date of any covert weapons programs, except for a number of failures to comply fully with international inspection programs. Absence of evidence, however, is not evidence of absence, and there are a number of reasons to believe that Iran might be pursuing nuclear weapons.

Iran has long had aspirations of establishing itself as a regional power on par with Israel, and has largely succeeded in becoming a leader among its neighbors. However, Iran's ability to effectively project power and influence major political issues in the region is hampered by its lack of nuclear deterrent capabilities. The lack of nuclear weapons in the Middle East has allowed Israel to maintain its dominant status, and has left the majority of Muslim nations open to intervention and attack by Western nations. If Iran could successfully develop nuclear weapons, it would not only solidify its role as a primary regional power, but would also gain a deterrent guarantee against foreign intervention or any attempt at regime change.

Keeping these major incentives for nuclear development in mind, it seems very logical to conclude that Iran would pursue such weapons, especially in light of their past record of noncompliance with weapons inspectors. The amount of suspicious evidence seems so overwhelming that it could be termed a "slam dunk" -- and as America has learned all too well in its experience in Iraq, such overwhelming circumstantial evidence can easily backfire. If the Bush administration is unable to positively establish the existence of such programs, it is unlikely that the rest of the international community will go along with the harsh sanctions (and possible military actions) desired by Washington.

In the meantime, the issue of Iran's noncompliance will likely be dealt with through any number of weak sanctions and harshly worded denunciations. That is to say, Iran's noncompliance will likely not be dealt with in any serious manner until the U.S. is able to provide more than declarations of its suspicions. For hawks in the Bush administration, this situation is unacceptable as it allows Iran to move ever-closer to gaining nuclear capabilities. Contrary to a number of experts who estimate the Iranian nuclear timetable at anywhere from 5 years to a decade, many are warning of a "point of no return" after which Iran will inevitably gain nuclear weapons, no matter what further actions are taken by the international community.

This growing disconnect between those who demand immediate (and often military) action and those who are comfortable at this point with extended diplomatic negotiations is likely to end in frustration for Washington. Earlier in his administration, president Bush would not have hesitated before ordering massive military action against Iran to prevent the "mad mullahs" from coming into possession of nuclear weapons. This, however, is 2006 and much of Bush's credibility and energy have been expended in the ongoing slaughter in Iraq. No doubt the president would love to deal with Iran just as he dealt with Saddam's government, however he is incapable of dealing with Iran precisely because he chose to go after Saddam.

In the best case scenario, Iran would cease its enrichment efforts, open its facilities to inspectors and prove that it was not developing any illegal weapons capabilities -- this, however, is highly unlikely as it would amount to political suicide for Iranian president Ahmadinejad. While Iran could conceivably open its facilities and prove its innocence, it is highly unlikely that any Iranian official would dare cease enrichment activities. The Iranian people pride themselves on their sovereignty, and passionately assert their right to develop peaceful nuclear technology. Any cessation of enrichment would amount to a surrender of this sovereignty, and would be met with outrage among the Iranian people. Sadly, in the atmosphere of suspicion that currently prevails, any good-faith efforts by Iran short of stopping enrichment programs would almost certainly be rejected as insufficient (or mere stalling) by the United States.

The worst case scenario, against which many realistic thinkers are now bracing themselves, could go one of two ways: either an indefinite stalling of diplomatic negotiations culminating in the announcement that Iran has developed nukes in the meantime, or a brash unilateral attack on Iranian facilities by the U.S. or Israel culminating in a horrific regional war that would make Iraq look like Iowa.

In walking the thin line between ineffectiveness and belligerence, American diplomats and policymakers can only hope for some political miracle -- a new development or Iranian change of heart -- that will turn the tides in their favor. As things stand now, Iran appears to be holding more than a few trump cards, and any attempt to restrain its programs (illegal or not) are very likely to meet with failure.