The Mind of a Neocon

In order to understand how the current situation in the Middle East is viewed by those in the Bush administration and their supporters, it is useful to consider the writings of Victor Davis Hanson, the archetypal (or stereotypical) neoconservative and "war historian" who, in the words of one writer, "never met a war he didn't want to send others to fight." Writing for National Review Online (link here), one of the main strongholds of pro-war neoconservative thinkers, Hanson recently ran down a list of pro-war, pro-administration talking points, as he commonly does. While Hanson's article -- called "Has Bush -- or the World -- Changed?" -- is characteristically long on assertions and short on substantiation, it is still enlightening as it reveals the odd worldview of many "neocons" and Republicans.

As usual, Hanson briefly presents the typical favorite claimed "victories" of America's efforts in the Middle East: "the Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon, the about-face in Libya, democratic peeps in the Gulf, or the end of the career of Dr. Khan." In Hanson's mind, the lessening of the Syrian presence in Lebanon is somehow not a result of widespread Lebanese opposition to the Syrian presence, or of worldwide condemnation of Syria for its presence in Lebanon, but is rather a result of Syria being somehow intimidated by the U.S. presence in Iraq. Similarly, the Libyan turn away from WMDs, which should be attributed to a long process of diplomatic work by America and others, is presented by Hanson as being a result of America's belligerence in Iraq. The disturbance of A.Q. Khan's underground nuclear proliferation ring also had little to do with the invasion of Iraq, as it centered mainly around Pakistan, Iran and North Korea, making its inclusion in this list of "effects of the Iraqi democracy on the larger Middle East" very questionable. In Hanson's simple, cartoonish view of world politics, all America must do is arbitrarily start wars and the bad guys wet themselves with fear.

Hanson also discusses a few ways in which he thinks the world has changed since 2001. There is the introduction of an "added nuclear component" to a number of recent issues (referring to North Korea and possibly Iran), issues of oil and the politics of energy, and a new "relativist standard of international behavior for roguish regimes", in which the possession of oil or nuclear weapons serves to legitimize "non-democratic" nations.

While Hanson is happy to dubiously claim victory for Bush's foreign policy regarding the earlier developments Syria, Libya, and the Khan network, it of course never occurs to him that the growing instability in the Middle East and beyond could be a result of Bush's policies. All three of the problems mentioned by Hanson have either been created or aggravated by Bush's foreign policy choices. The regimes in Iran and North Korea have displayed increasing aggression and audacity in their development of nuclear weapons precisely because America is currently stuck in a position of relative weakness. Bogged down, over-extended, and uniquely vulnerable in Iraq (and Afghanistan), with American troops within range of North Korean missiles in South Korea and Japan, and lacking international credibility and support, America has been foolishly discredited and weakened by the current administration. The failure of Bush's policies are serving as an open invitation for bold moves from America's opponents.

Furthermore, the increasing instability of global oil supplies and the accompanying increase in power among oil supplying states -- called a "relativist standard" by Hanson -- are in no small part due to the instability wrought by American warmaking throughout the Arab world. Hanson's willful blindness to the negative effects of belligerent foreign policy, coupled with his odd insistence that America is magically causing reform in the Middle East, show the lengths to which supporters of Bush's foreign policy must stretch today to justify continuation of failed policies.